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Abstract
This paper analyzes the efficient management of nonpoint source pollution (NPS) under limited pollution
control budget and incomplete information inherent in NPS pollution. By incorporating information
acquisition into a pollution control model, it focuses on the tradeoff between data collection and
treatment efforts and derives conditions under which (i) a favorable change in the state of treatment cost
at one site may lead to an increase in treatment level at another site, (ii) a higher data collection cost
induces more data collection, and (iii) an increase in information productivity leads to an increase in the
level of data collection.  A numerical simulation of the model illustrates how in managing NPS pollution
the value of information acquisition depends on the degree of heterogeneity of polluting sites.
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I. Introduction
In this paper, we take a constrained management approach to nonpoint source (NPS) pollution
control where the focus is no longer the decision of the social planner who maximizes social welfare,
but rather, more realistically, the decision of a manager who maximizes pollution control given a
limited budget.  The management of sediment loading from abandoned logging roads in Redwood
National Park, Orick, CA. motivated this research.  During high storm events, run-off is diverted from
stream channels, at each road crossing, causing sediment to enter tributaries as the run-off returns to the
channel downstream from the crossing (Spreiter et al. [13]).  The sediment loading threatens salmon
spawning habitat and the Tall Trees Grove, home of the world's tallest trees.
The manager’s problem is further constrained by the incomplete information inherent in NPS
pollution.  By the definition of NPS pollution, information on the linkage between polluting sites and
ambient load is incomplete.  More specifically, while the pollution manager can observe the total
ambient load or the consequent damage, she is unable or it is prohibitively costly, to detect with
certainty the pollution from each individual site.  This incomplete information creates uncertainty about
the efficient treatment frontier.  The manager can reduce the treatment uncertainty by extracting
information from collected data, which in turn increases treatment effectiveness by allowing the
manager to reallocate treatment to relatively larger polluting sites.  However, the manager faces an
explicit tradeoff between treatment effort and effectiveness because data collection is costly and the
manager is fiscally constrained.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of incomplete information in NPS pollution
control.  By incorporating information acquisition into a pollution control model, the analysis allows us
to focus on the tradeoff between treatment effort and effectiveness, which has yet to be fully explored
in the literature.  Furthermore, we explicitly consider the role of heterogeneity in the manager’s2
decision, where the manager exploits the heterogeneity among the polluting sites to lower the sediment
related damage for a given expenditure on treatment activity.  In addition, we analyze the influence data
collection and treatment costs have on the optimal budget allocations.
Previous research on the constrained public manager appears in Barrett and Segerson [1]
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Their work implies that misspecification of the behavioral objective, between the alternatives of social
welfare maximization and damage minimization subject to a manager's budget constraint, matters and
can lead to a wrong policy prescription.  This research extends the work of Polinsky and Shavell [9] by
considering the alternative assumption of the fiscally constrained manager and by incorporating
uncertainty as characterized in Litchenberg and Zilberman [7].  However, Barrett and Segerson do not
provide a mechanism for the manager to resolve the uncertainty, and thus our study extends the
constrained manager problem by including data collection.
The past research on information acquisition in pollution control problems is rather scanty.
Rausser and Howitt [10] examine information acquisition in analyzing regulatory mechanisms.  Kolstad
[5] considers the role of acquiring information in optimal policy to control global climate change.  Cabe
and Herriges [2] introduce information acquisition in the regulation of NPS pollution, where
information reduces the social cost associated with setting an ambient concentration tax control
mechanism as proposed by Segerson [11].  Our problem differs from this past work since the setting for
pollution control in our analysis involves incomplete information on the present state of NPS pollution
in a constrained management framework.
Our work is also related to Weitzman [14], who provides a diversity theory, which incorporates
the degree of differences in genetic characteristics among various species of crane.  This difference
                                                
1 Similarly, Garvie and Keeler [3] consider the budgetary tradeoff between data collection and enforcement for a public
regulator.3
allows the manager to determine which species are most vital for the survival of the genetic base.  In
extreme cases, allowing some species to go extinct may be optimal, since it serves to increase the
probability of survival for the remaining species.  In the context of our problem, knowledge of the
degree of loading diversity between the sites allows the manager to increase treatment effectiveness by
reallocating her budget and further reducing sediment related damage.  Once again, in extreme cases,
some sites may go untreated because they contribute little or nothing to sediment-related damage.
This paper contributes to the literature by extending the previous research on the management of
NPS pollution to include information acquisition and explicit consideration of heterogeneity of
sediment loading from the polluting sites.  We illustrate the role of information acquisition in reducing
NPS pollution uncertainty.  To this end, we show that ignoring the difference among the polluting sites
results in larger damages than would result if the differences are exploited.  We also see that, by
increasing the effectiveness of treatment effort, the first unit of information obtained about the sediment
loading distribution, makes a particularly large contribution to reducing expected damages.  These
results lead us to suggest that data collection and other efforts to distinguish the degree of heterogeneity
among the polluting sites play an important role in the optimal control of NPS pollution.  Furthermore,
in our analysis, we derive conditions under which a favorable change in the state of costs in one site can
lead to an increase in treatment level at another site, and a higher data collection cost induces more,
rather than less, data collection.  We also derive conditions under which increased productivity of
information acquisition leads to a reduction in the level of information collection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The following section analyzes the sediment
control when information is incomplete and data collection is costly.  Section III provides the
comparative static results for some of the key parameters of the model.  Section IV presents the
simulation model and numerical results.  In this section, we compare the behavior of a perfectly17
Model I and II.  Table IV contains the optimal treatment levels for the perfectly informed
manager under the various heterogeneity scenarios.  For the uninformed manager (UI) who
assumes a prior uniform distribution over all heterogeneity scenarios, the first row of Table
IV (x
1 = 4.980, x
2 = 7.469, x
3 = 2.988) represents the treatment levels applied to control
sediment loading under every heterogeneity scenario.  Column 1 in Table V shows the
damage corresponding to the optimal treatment levels under each scenario (see Table IV)
when the manager has perfect information about the distribution of ambient load across
sites.  Column 2 in Table V shows the damage resulting from uniformed budget allocation.
Here the manager's choice of treatment levels always remains the same as presented for
scenario 1 in Table IV, but depending on which one of the true scenarios may actually occur,
the distribution of sediment loads, s
k, and therefore the actual level of abatement, f
k, will
differ.  In turn, this leads to a different actual extent of damage for the different scenarios.
We see from Table V that when the manager has perfect information less damage results,
because of the manager exploits the greater degree of heterogeneity in allocating the budget
more efficiently.  We also see that the marginal value of perfect information (MV) increases
as the difference between the true distribution and the prior distribution grows (i.e., as
heterogeneity rises).18





1 4.980 7.469 2.988
2 4.980 7.469 2.988
3 5.260 7.362 2.834
4 5.525 7.263 2.676
5 5.783 7.167 2.512
6 6.037 7.077 2.336
7 6.285 6.991 2.150
8 6.532 6.912 1.945
9 6.781 6.839 1.717
10 7.035 6.775 1.452
11 7.303 6.725 1.119













1 850.7 850.7 0.0 0.0
2 850.7 850.7 0.0 0.0
3 848.7 849.1 0.4 0.4
4 847.5 849.1 1.6 1.2
5 847.0 850.7 3.6 2.0
6 847.4 853.9 6.5 2.8
7 848.6 858.9 10.3 3.8
8 850.8 866.0 15.2 4.9
9 854.1 875.8 21.6 6.4
10 858.9 889.1 30.2 8.6
11 865.7 908.3 42.6 12.4
                                                
7 Scenario 1 and 2 are identical due to rounding.22
setting for studying NPS pollution control.  The nature of this problem required a sequential
optimization approach.  The comparative static results show the manager will vary her decisions, over
the two periods, if she has the ability to change all allocation decisions and not just allocation to
treatment effort across sites.  The numerical results show that the manager can exploit the heterogeneity
of the sites to such a level that significant gains in damage reductions can be achieved.
Future analysis should examine the problem in a dynamic setting.  Over an arbitrary period of
time, the manager chooses investment paths for both information acquisition and treatment efforts.
During this time horizon, several factors will influence the dynamics of each path.  Principal among
these factors is the decline of the productivity of information acquisition as uncertainty about the degree
of heterogeneity is reduced.  This suggests that the manager will decrease data collection and
information acquisition over time.  Secondly, as treatment at the site with the largest sediment load
occurs early in the time horizon, the system will become increasingly less heterogeneous (Kestenbaum
[4]).  With a decreasing heterogeneity of sediment loading over time, we expect that at some future date
the treatment policy will change from a heterogeneous treatment strategy to a homogeneous treatment
strategy.  Future research will shed light on this issue.23
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distribution on q.  Originally, Shannon [12] used this metric to measure uncertainty from receiving a
noisy signal and we follow by characterizing the uncertainty on sediment loading with this metric.  The
entropy metric allow us to attribute information acquisition (or a reduction in uncertainty) when the
expected shares of sediment loading move away from uniform, since the entropy over the shares is
lower for any distribution other than the uniform (or least informative) distribution.  The divergence
















ln ) ( ) : (
0
1
1 0 1 .
This divergence is the marginal product of data collection when the distributions represent the
information from two consecutive observations on Q, the ambient sediment load.  The lower bound on
K is zero, which occurs when the prior and posterior distributions are identical.  The upper bound is the
entropy measure on the prior distribution, since in the extreme case of a collapsed posterior distribution
with an entropy measure of zero all the information is acquired, and thus the marginal information gain
is that of the entropy measure on the prior distribution.  The benefit of this information metric is that it
allows us to consider changes in any moment of the distribution and thus is more general than the
traditional standard deviation-mean ratio approach for measuring uncertainty.